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This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2a-3(2)(gT, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. Defendant/ 
appellant appeals the Finding^ 'of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Seventh Judicial District 
Court of Ointah couhty on September 10, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESEN^Eb FOR REVIEW 
l\ Did the trial coutt abuse its discretion when it 
valued the equity in defendants car lot at $18/Q(!)0 witftfrut 
first deducting defendant's $12,000 investment in the lot ttVa't 
was obtained from the proceeds of the Collins contract, which 
money was only temporarily being'used'to finance cars^and was-
Dwed to a third party? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
valued the equity in defendant's car lot without first 
deducting $3700 owed to the State of Utah- for unpaid sales 
taxes on cars sold.from the lot? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
awarded payment of alimony to plaintiff1t regardless ,of whether 
plaintiff remarried? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on June 22, 1977, in 
Coeur DfAlene, Idaho. One child was born as issue of the 
marriage, Erin inabnit, currently age 9. (R.l) 
2. Prior to and during the marriage, the defendant 
acquired certain pieces of real property in Montana and resold 
these to others p;i contract, (£.41-42) 
3. One of these transactions involved a contract 
referred to a^ the Collins contract* The contract provided 
that Collins would pay defendant $17,000 and defendant owed 
$12,000 of this to JSB, when-JSB could furnish good title to 
the property for Collins. (TR.77) 
4. In May or June of 1986, Collins paid defendant 
$17,000 on the contract^ Defenda^ invested $5000 of the 
proceeds in the mobile home business and $12,000 in
 J the*, car 
lot business. (TR.77) The $12,000-, in, the car lot business is 
owed to JSB_9S soon as JSB can provide good title to the 
Collins property. (TR.84) 
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r) , pi c a l c u l a t i n g dt-f'-mi.iu! >•- uquLty in the cai l o t , 
t h<- $18 r00if l i m i n e cont.-noed in d e f e n d a n t ' s i impos^d 
wpi, t- j oiTii/*iit i n c l u d e s d e f e n d a n t ' s temper i ' ; »hf r uu i t iun ni 
$12 ,000 from t he C o l l i n . ni i i i , ( n;
 f n 4 J rhe c o u r t r e f u s e d 
t o d e d u c t i:hn f. i ,• , HUM MI. determining de fendan 1 j u i i v . 
( \'u , lu
 :i, l i n e s 7-9) 
6* At the i im.j .ii d i v o r c e , d e f e n d a n t ' s car: lot «/«*«(! 
the P^-it"- i" i •, ' oinraiss ion $3700 in bejtek dtnj - M L ^ S t a x e s . 
(TK.W4, l i n e s 12-131 
, ^ g ° ** h ^  * a i * ' - -
"• » d • -.-: automobi le • o ^ - . n i n : 
Bank, . • automobi le w-* ^ . * - « 
defendant ; -
. - . : ' : . : . ! . •• ' - • 1 not- c~ jse j . n^ 
remarriage of s i ' r . The .. y -*fte; >- Decree 
D i V O r < > * •-•; *,: t; .r* * •• 4 -: ' . j . : l _ pxciin o: . 
(See Appendix A) 
STATEMENT OF -PROCEEDINGS•BELOW 
( . J.; - Aj'j . - °^* •".. i • . i v o r ^ e 
a c t i o r - - + •.- Seventh " J H I L I C C .* -r, ^ounty, 
S t a t e ;: . 1 <~^  > ^ ^ ; ^ ? \ p l a i n t i f 
l a i nc if t * s amended c*> *v.i ( R . 2 3 - 2 4 * p r e t r i a l 
e t t lement: --. vac ^e; ieduied t o be h •'-1 d in , : 
Dinmi^sioner Howard fMaetani uii August -•! , i ^n .' !, rt, J4-35) 
purchase* 
i 
: * u • i 
month 
7 
-: - a C e 
^nd 
I . n 
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After pretrial, the Commissioner certified the matter as ready 
for trial in the District Court. (R.62) The matter was tried 
to the court on August 31, 1987, the Honorable Dennis L. 
Draney presiding. (R.98> The couiM: -signed its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on September 10, 1987. 
(R.115-122) Defendant filed an objection to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law <m September 10, 1987. (R.101) 
Defendant filed a motion to amend plaintiffls Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on September 14, 1987. (R.127) 
Plaintiff responded to- ^defendant's motion to amend on 
September 18, 1987. The coutt tdrs^d a final order on October 
15, 1987 denying defendantrs" motion to amend. (R.156) 
Defendant filed a Notice *of* 'Appeal on October 30', 1987. 
(R.158). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when-'it' valued 
defendant's equity in the car lot at $18,000 without first 
deducting $12,000 invested in.the car lot/ from . the proceeds 
from the Colliris contract, which money was only temporarily 
available to defendant and will eventually be paid to JSB. 
After deducting the $12,000 temporary cash infusion into the 
business defendant's equity is actually only $6000. Moreover, 
the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to deduct 
$3700 owed to the State of Utah for past due sales taxes due 




 ~ i-*ht •-.*• car 1 o*'. ", tM "in i 'mi i " i . a i l o d t o d e d u c t t h i s 
fr-MTi - ie f^r idn . u y i n« Hie l o t , - D e f e n d a n t s t i l l «>w« ,• '> >' i 
• i ^ o u n t wag n o t p t ropeM) . t c o Mint mJ l o r H I t h e 
c i r .o t balance s h e e t , 
uJ: t abused i t s disci:et i on when i• i « • i ';• i 
t,- its aware of alimony in |/l.nm ;ontinue after 
plaintiff remarries Tlr' purpose behind .inoii. M " 
equalize as 'r'nii .is possible th^ 1 i \? i n - • : •> .i| Hu" 
parties during t - *•-*** • *:- .-.. y m g , plaintiff no 
longer needs i I i .efendan beino punished by 
paymen ri (-^  -.*<r. - u |i underlying 
purpose \ ;r support io nu ± « essary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT.I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED 
TO CREDIT THE $12,000 RECEIVED PROM THE COLLINS CONTRACT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT'S EQUITY IN THE CAR LOT? 
The appellate standard I i»,'Vi"w -m decisions of the 
trial court regarding I h .'.iluation of marital assets is ibn* 
det^ rini'irit i.ni i,l. the yr;ilue of assets will not- ' • «1 j a tu roed on 
appea 1 absent a clear =ibuse o(: • 1 i ,-•«;:i•«i \ i on . Lee v, Lee , 144 
P . 2d 137 8 (iJ t; ,i 1 - '""; • | • ' "»1' ' >" i' c i \; i no T u r n e r v. T u r n e r , 649 \' • I 
5,,, M [,t" ,in i i*,41(' \ 
The Lee court recognizee howi'....* that "tlir trial court 
mst ma*e <^ n .all material issues and u.s fin o 
o constitutes reversible error unl^s^ i ii>< i acts i u tin* 
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record are a clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only finding in favor o£ judgment." Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The findings must be sufficiently 
detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the 
steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual 
issue presented. 
In the Lee case .-the r, xoutb and Tthe .trial rcourt faced 
the problem of Valuing a corporation where the husband owned 
52% of the stock in the corporation. This Court held that the 
trial court abused its discretion by not valuing the 
corporation and awarding the wife an interest in the 
corporation. J^ d. at 1380. 
In Lee, citing Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 
1984), the court recommended that: 
The trial court could hava assigned a value to D 
& D (corporation). The trial court could then 
have determined 52 percent of the company as 
representing the husband's interest, subtracted 
any premarital contribution by the husband, and 
halved the remainder to reach the wife's marital 
cash share of the corporation. (Emphasis added) 
Lee at 1381. 
In the case at hand the court determined the equity in 
the car lot to be- $18,000. The defendant -testified however* 
that the $12,000 received from the Collins contract had,been 
placed into -the- business. .(TR.59, lines 2-15) Moreover, 
defendant^ specifically testified ~und6r cross.examination,;that 
his $18,000^estimate of equity in-the-car lot.included, thei 
-6-
-...uOO infusion received from i h- '" 1.1ms contract, (TR.84, : 
lines 10-20) Th* d«jf ctuntnf, uiily had temporary \i*e ni i he 
ir linn the Collins contract as tha' -*ey would 
eventually qu to J S H , Tim., il"i.eria<jiit l s actual equitv
 ;1 Une 
car lot was m».i ,} | >i nun ind ,^.|IIJO, excluding foi m-w • *' ftsue 
i-f h,n-K ilii^  sales taxes in thp amount ut" •(, i/ifn 
The trial conM • • r i »•' cl in finding that defendant V 
equity i" i i«e ear business was no\ t^duei'H i^  i he $12,000 
invested in the business from th*j '-Ml in.' contract. 
7-w * * inequitat h r r m ^ 
cou* -i .* i -• ? > : separat-- . enefit 
nheritanc<- sne le * - -r randmother and 
required defenda; pn^v funds used fron \- c > rr 
. * *' I <• • < l ~ . * C ** «. * '* i 
jfi^ y r -i * -. ^ '•:.-- * ia the *.>w: - :• 
defendant* core. • - \~ . ,i: ^> ^  ar - 1 - -. <t 
• • mil, really equity before a«dia
 ; ;:i >ne-hal: the 
equity in the lot. 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 1,3 DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED 
TO DEDUCT THE CAR BUSINESS SALES TAX LIABILITY OF $3700 FROM 
DEPENDANT'S EQUITY TN THE r ±p 
.- - - .. i< ". : equity r. " *« , it the court 
failed i J deduct. \ .e :-a^?' * • . I M sains taxes i ncurred 
:ro:n -h- sale , tomobi i -. -, •. • ;he c^ii lot A I I i: i, ,i 1 , • 
e r^ ' ^stif.- "•.-»•„ : ri ^ s i n e s s **n*n f< * in the State 
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of Utah for unpaid sales taxes and this amount was not figured 
into the $18,000 equity figures. (tfR.84, lines 10-13) 
In its oral findings, the court refused to apply the 
tax liability against the equity in the business stating: 
"And that $3700 does not: detract from the equity in the 
business, that being a business expense." (TR.103, lines 9-10) 
Defendant respectfully submits that the court abused 
its discretion when it failed to deduct the tax liability from 
defendant's equity in the car lot. The liability still must 
be paid and it was incurred directly in the operation of the 
business. As a business expense it is a liability that must 
be accounted for in arriving at a balance sheet prior to 
determining the defendant's equity ira/the car lot. 
POINT III) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED PLAINTIFF 
ALIMONY WITHOUT TERMINATING IT UPON REMARRIAGE. 
in numerous decisions the Utah Supreme Court and this 
Court has long recognized that the purpose of alimony is to 
"provide support for the wife and not inflict punitive damages 
upon the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty 
against the husband nor a reward to the wife." Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 326 (Utah App 1987) (quoting English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-412, Utah 1977). 
Section 30-3-5(2) U.C.A. provides: 
(2) Unless the decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court that* 
a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall 
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse. 
-8-
In the case at hand, the court ordered defendant- to 
pay plaintiff's car payment of $200*18 per month as alimony 
until the car loan was paid in full. Defendant's counsel 
specifically requested that the alimony provision 
automatically terminate upon plaintiff's remarriage. (TR.104, 
line 19) The court stated that the alimony provision would 
continue regardless of remarriage. (TR.104, lines 20-21). 
Plaintiff remarried the day after the decree was final. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the Court abused 
its discretion when it ordered defendant to_ pay $200.18 a 
month as alimony regardless of the marital status of 
plaintiff. O.C.A. §30-3-5(2) and subsequent court decisions 
clearly contemplate that alimony is to maintain $s much as 
possible the standard of living the parties engaged during the 
marriage and avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving 
public assistance. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985); Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1987) 
Those concerns are clearly minimal when the spouse is 
employed and immediately remarries a new husband who also is 
employed. As such the court abused its discretion in 
requiring defendant to pay alimony even after plaintiff 
emarries. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, defendant respectfully requests 
tat this Court reverse the decision of the trial court on the 
-9-
above issues and remand this too the trial court for further 
consideration. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of March, 1988. 
MCRAEJ& DeLAND 
fARRY M. SOUVALL 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to Larry A. Steele, Attorney for Respondents 319 
West 100 South, Vernal, Utah 84078 on this 9th day of March, 
1988. 
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STATE OF UTAH COUNTY OF UEVTAH 
To Any Person Legally Authorized to Sole maize Marriage, Creetiug, 
You Are Hereby Authorized to Joiu lu W H MMEIWQNW 
Michael Clinton Hamner 
Uintah 
Patricia Jean Inahnit 
™^G%*/^ Utah 
Uintah OMa^&fctfca/L-. UTAH 
.vf&ui/-
Aa*Vt0 ?<**"- MO0Mt'&J04&\//%ir/raW W I™£SS my hand and ott.cal seal hereto aff.xad at my omca in VERNAL. UTAH 
10th SeDtember 
STATE OF UTAH 




WAS ACCORDING TO THE RITES OF £ *y y J / /*/{ UL J THE NATURE OF THE CEREMONY 
WAS A PRESENT MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES FOR ALL TIME. 
WE WERE MARRIED,AS STATEO IN THIS CERTIFICATE AND ARE NOW HUSBAND AND WIFE 
day nf epte ber 
/gorothv C. Luck^ / 
'J\ C*Ju^4™/*jpJk 
()(\()(\{\MMnnnnnn"nn' 
N O T I C E ! ^° P01**** Performing marriages: I* •'* * » A-
